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INTRODUCTION

In the poor parts of American cities there is always at least one busy
intersection with a dozen establishments offering rent-to-own goods, pay* Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; A.B., Harvard College; J.D.,
Yale Law School; Ph.D. in American Studies, University of Michigan. The author thanks
Casey Shorts, Marquette University Law School, Candidate for Juris Doctor, 2014, for his
excellent research assistance.
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day loans, or title loans. These establishments can also be found in suburbs and rural areas, and even on Indian reservations, but the
concentration of these establishments in American inner-cities is
unrivaled.'
Rent-to-own outlets, payday lenders, and title pawns target the urban
poor. Their garish signs, flashing lights, and extended business hours are
designed to entice the impoverished people of our inner-cities. More fundamentally, rent-to-own outlets, payday lenders, and title pawns rely on
refined and time-tested business models developed to ensnare the urban
poor in terribly disadvantageous transactions.
How and why do the urban poor fall victim to the unscrupulous practices of these businesses? While the urban poor have less money than
members of the middle and upper classes, they do have enough money to
avail themselves of rent-to-own outlets, payday lenders, and title pawns.2
"Poverty" in the United States is relative, and does not preclude one from
acquiring goods and loans.' Furthermore, the urban poor are often especially anxious to acquire these goods and loans and are quite willing to
spend a large portion of their disposable income to obtain such items.4
The goods and loans are welcome, not only in and of themselves, but also
as symbols of desirable, albeit elusive, lifestyles.'
In the end, the urban poor who shop and borrow at rent-to-own outlets, payday lenders, and title pawns do in fact pay exorbitant amounts
that are much higher than what they would pay for goods at ordinary
retail shops or loans at the local bank.6 As scholars have argued for al-

See

SuRvEY OF RENT-TO-OWN
30 (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/renttoown/renttoownr.pdf
(finding "[h]ouseholds in the central cities of metropolitan areas and in non-metropolitan
areas had a significantly higher incidence of rent-to-own use" than households in suburban
areas).
2. See Shane M. Mendenhall, Note, Payday Loans: The Effects of Predatory Lending
on Society and the Need for More State and FederalRegulation, 32 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
299, 308 (2007) (explaining consumers entering these transactions "are not even living
paycheck to paycheck . . . these people are borrowing against their next paycheck to meet
living expenses[,]" "are stretched to the limit financially," and are living below the middleclass); see also Jim Hawkins, Renting the Good Life, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2041,
2058-64 (2008) (finding although rent-to-own customers have lower incomes, "nearly
[eighty-four] percent had a car or truck, virtually the same percentage as the general public" and "have more access to credit than one might assume").
3. See id. at 307.
4. See id. at 307-08.
5. See Hawkins, supra note 2, at 2062 (contending that "rent-to-own goods are not
primarily essential goods but instead are goods that enhance the quality of customers'
lives").
6. Id. at 2044 ("The overall cost for the merchandise ends up doubling or tripling the
1.

JAMES M. LACKO ETI AL., FED. TRADE COMM'N,

CUSTOMERS

cost of purchasing it outright at another store."). See, e.g.,
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most fifty years, it is routinely the case that the poor pay more than middle and upper-class Americans for comparable goods and services.' This
includes food, housing, transportation, insurance, mortgages, and health
care,8 and it certainly includes goods and loans from rent-to-own outlets,
payday lenders, and title pawns.
This article has four major sections. The first three sections examine
the business models of the rent-to-own outlets, payday lenders, and title
pawns, focusing particularly on the highly crafted, standardized contractual agreement that is central to each business's survival. The fourth section of this article reviews the leading efforts by courts and legislatures to
limit the exploitative practices of these businesses and argues such reform
efforts have been ineffective.
The business models and concomitant contractual agreements of rentto-own outlets, payday lenders, and title pawns are so sophisticated and
adjustable as to make them virtually impervious to regulation. As a result, rent-to-own outlets, payday lenders, and title pawns continue not
only to exploit the urban poor, but also to socioeconomically subjugate
the urban poor by trapping them into a ceaseless debt cycle. A blanket
proscription of these tawdry businesses might be the only way to drive
them from our midst and to eliminate their active role in the perpetuation
of urban poverty.
II.

A.

RENT-TO-OWN

Development of Commodification and the Rent-to-Own Business

The rent-to-own business emerged in the United States during the
1960s and then grew rapidly during the 1970s and 1980s as independent
"mom and pop" stores and regional outlets gave way to large national
chains.9 Two national chains, Rent-A-Center and Rent-Way, came to
own half the rent-to-own stores in the country, and during the 1990s both

16-19 (1967) (discussing
that the low-income market differs as it has to charge a "high markup on low-quality
goods" in order to protect merchants from their risky credit transactions).
7. See DeNeen L. Brown, The High Cost of Poverty: Why the Poor Pay More, WASH.
Pos-r, May 18, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/17/
AR2009051702053. html (identifying food, housing, mortgages, transportation, health care,
payday loans, insurance, goods and loans from rent-to-own outlets, and title pawns); see
also CAPLOVITZ, supra note 6 (describing the quality of being "price and quality conscious"
that often allows those in higher income levels to avoid unfair deals, but is missing in many
of the poor); Erik Eckholm, Study Documents 'Ghetto Tax' Being Paid by the Urban Poor,
N.Y. TIMEs, July 19, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/19/us/19poor.html.
8. See Brown, supra note 7.
PAY MoRE: CONSUMER PRAencES oi Low-INCOME FAMILIES

9. LACKO Er AL., supra note 1, at 2-3.
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of those chains doubled in size."o By 2006, Rent-A-Center was the largest
rent-to-own company in the United States." Along with its rent-to-own
competitors, Rent-A-Center employs a business model well suited to exploiting members of the urban poor seeking relatively expensive consumer goods.12 Some of the most commonly acquired goods include
televisions, sofas, washers, stereos, beds, dryers, refrigerators, chairs, and
dining room tables.' 3 Despite sharp criticism of the industry from consumer advocates, the rent-to-own business remains highly successful

today.14
The rent-to-own business is a resourceful participant and facilitator in
the process known in academic literature as "commodification."'I In the
particular context of consumer capitalism, commodification refers to the
way items of all kinds are constantly turned into "commodities."' 6 Although we instantly think first of consumer goods, "commodities" need
not necessarily be objects. Commodification can and does take place
with services, as well as with the news, educational offerings, political positions, and even the adoption of children." Commodification is a central
process in consumer capitalism; as sad as it might be, many go through
life thinking of themselves first and foremost as consumers of commodi-

10. Id. at 3.
11. Perez v. Rent-A-Ctr., Inc., 892 A.2d 1255, 1258 (N.J. 2006); see also Consumer
Reports Investigation: Would You Pay the Equivalent of 311 Percent Interest to Own a BigScreen TV?, CONSUME RREPORTS.ORG, http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/money/shop-

ping/ rentacenter/overview/index.htm (last updated June 2011) (explaining the predatory
practices of rent-to-own businesses).
12. See LACKO ET AL., supra note 1, at 32 (finding rent-to-own businesses prey on
individuals who are "African American, younger, less educated, have lower incomes, have
children in the household, rent their residence, live in the South, and live in non-suburban
areas[ ]"); see generally Hawkins, supra note 2 (analyzing the exploitive effects of the rentto-own business model).

13. Id. at 52 tbl. 4.3.
14. See Opinion, Rent-A-Center Is a Ripoff that Preys on the Poor,N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
Nov. 25,2009, http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/rent-a-center-ripoff-preys-poor-article1.420198 (describing the protests and state actions against rent-to-own outlets and such
outlets' subsequent lobbying which have protected and promoted their existence).
15. See Michael Ralph, Commodity, 27 Soc. TEXT 78, 78 (2009) (defining "commodification" as the theory by which "any entity can be objectified and reified-and set
into an exchange equation" for the purpose of buying, selling, borrowing, or trading).

16. Id.
17. See David Ray Papke, Pondering Past Purposes: A Critical History of American
Adoption Law, 102 W. VA. L. REv. 459, 469 (1999) (providing examples of services that
can be commoditized, purchased, and sold).
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ties." This idea is captured in the familiar saying, "I shop, therefore I
am."' 9
Commodification in the United States matured in the 1920s. 20 Advertising has contributed to the marketing of commodities by highlighting
individual commodities' best features and by calling attention to the
many commodities available in the market place.2 1 More subtly, advertising, with its happy faces and cheerful outcomes, has promoted "consumption as a way of life." 2 2
Modern-day retailers, advertisers, and others assure us consumer goods
will bring us happiness or one sort of another.2 3 For example, commercials and print advertisements attempt to make us believe that the right
type of car can make us prettier or more virile and cell phones can make
us more socially active. Products such as Viagra or Cialis, according to
the narratives in their advertisements, provide sexual satisfaction for not
only users of the products but also the users' partners. More generally,
the whole process of commodification-the making and selling of commodities-is held out as the pathway to contentment and achieving a
sense of well being in an unsettling world. 24 A belief in the rewards of
commodities has become almost an article of faith in the context of consumer capitalism.
There is some reason to think that the urban poor might be especially
desirous of the newest commodities. For starters, their lives are often less
fulfilling, and as a result, they might be more likely to long for goods that,
we have been told, bring contentment and happiness to those who possess them.25 The urban poor are not without commodities to begin with,
18. CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM: AMERICAN LIFE IN AN AGE
O1 DIMINISHING EXPECTATIONs 72 (1979) ("Advertising promote[s] consumption as a way
of life.").
19. D. Jasun Carr et al., Examining Overconsumption, Competitive Consumption, and
Conscious Consumption from 1994 to 2004: Disentangling Cohort and Period Effects,
644 ANNALS 220, 221-22 (2012) (citing JULIET B. SCIIOR, THE OVERSPENT AMERICAN:
WaIy WE WANT WHAT WE DON'T NEED (1999)).
20. See DANIEL HOROWrTZ, THE MORALITY OF SPENDING: ATrTUDES TOWARD THE
CONSUMER SOCIETY, 1875-1940, at 135 (1985).
21. See LASCH, supra note 18 (discussing the use of mass media to convince people
they "need" to buy goods).

22. Id.
23. SuT JHALLY, MEDIA EDuc. FOUND., ADVERTISING & TIE END OF THE WORLD
8-10 (1997) (stating the power of advertising exists in using images of social values, the real
source of happiness, and linking it to material objects).
24. See Carr et al., supra note 19; see also LASCH, supra note 18, at 73 (stating consumption has become an alternative means to protesting or rebelling that consumers use
change their surroundings).

25. See Elizabeth Sweet, Symbolic Capital, Consumption, and Health Inequality, 101
AM. J. PUB. HEALI- 260, 261 (2011) (arguing lower economic classes strive for the stan-
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but, looking around their streets and cities, they might experience feelings of relative deprivation. 26 The acquisition of more commodities
through rent-to-own outlets affords a perceived way to close the gap and
claim some degree of status.
Additionally, the urban poor as a group rely less on social relations and
institutions as the foundation of their identities than do the middle and
upper classes. They turn increasingly to what Professor Robert G. Dunn
calls "the mediated forms of signification derived from consumer goods,
telecommunications, and informational technology" to craft their personal identity. 27 Indeed, lacking an abundance of social capital and deprived of rich, supportive organizations and institutions, the urban poor
become especially likely to turn to commodities for existential
sustenance.
B.

Rent-to-Own Business Model

Having realized that the rent-to-own industry might be especially able
to profit from this commodity lust, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
conducted a study of over 12,000 households in hopes of gauging the nature and extent of rent-to-own use. 28 The study found that "rent-to-own
customers were more likely to be African American, younger, lower income, have children in the household, rent their residence, live in the
South, and live in non-suburban areas." 29 The majority of rent-to-own
customers are "high credit-risk consumers."3 0 Therefore, "Rent-to-own
agreements are typically entered into by customers who can neither afford to purchase the goods outright nor obtain credit."3
At the center of a rent-to-own transaction is a well-crafted, standardized agreement that controls all features of the transaction.3 2 This agreement obligates the customer to make weekly or, in some cases, monthly
dard of decency at the next highest level by symbolically displaying social status through
consumer goods).
26. Id. at 260 (defining relative deprivation as "a process of social comparison
whereby individuals feel deprived in relative evaluation with another reference group in
society").
27. Robert G. Dunn, Identity, Commodification, and Consumer Culture, in IDENTITY
AND SoCIAL CHANGE 113 (Joseph E. Davis ed., 2000).
28. LACKO ET AL., supra note 1, at 1.

29. Id. at 32.
30. James P. Nehf, Effective Regulation of Rent-to-Own Contracts, 52 OHIO ST. L.J.
751, 752 (1991).
31. Kathleen E. Keest et al., Interest Rate Regulation Developments: High-Cost Mortgages, Rent-to-Own Transactions,and Unconscionability, 50 Bus. LAw. 1081, 1086 (1995).
32. See generally Rent-to-Own Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), IRENTToOWN
.com, http://www.irenttoown.com/frequently-asked-questions#ql (last visited Oct. 16,
2013) (providing information on rent-to-own agreements and transactions).
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payments for the commodities the customer has selected. 3 Usually, the
store delivers the commodities to the customer's home for an additional
fee, 34 and the customer then assumes responsibility for maintenance.
However, under the terms of the agreement, the store remains the
owner of the commodities, and the weekly or monthly payments do not
yield an ownership interest for the customer. 36 Only if the customer
makes all the payments set out in the agreement or manages to pay a
lump sum for some percentage of the remaining payments does the customer come to own the commodities.3 1 "The prices paid for these goods,
however, may be more than double their retail prices by the time the
transaction has concluded.",3
Typically, customers make their weekly or monthly payments for as
long as they can; one industry representative estimated that eighty-five
percent of the customers actually pay in person at the store.39 Each visit
to the store in effect includes a new decision about whether to continue
because, after all, the option always exists to return the commodities and
terminate the transaction.4 0 If customers return weekly to make their
payments, a relationship develops between store employees and the customers. This presents the stores with "a tremendous business opportunity
to encourage customers to rent more products."4 1
It is worth noting that an important aspect of the rent-to-own business
model requires getting customers to acquire an ever-growing number of
commodities. 42 The previously-noted FTC study found that the average
rent-to-own customer rented two to three items within the preceding five
years.43 Thirteen percent of the customers, meanwhile, had rented at
least four items, and seven percent had rented more than five items.44
The stores also benefit from selling or, at least, attempting to sell, certain bundled services, such as insurance against theft and damage, that
supplement the transaction agreement. 45 Additionally, the stores offer a

33. Keest et al., supra note 31.
34. Nehf, supra note 30, at 832 (stating all rent-to-own statutes allow rent-to-own businesses to charge for delivery expenses).
35. Hawkins, supra note 2, at 2047.
36. Id.; see Keest et al., supra note 31, at 1086-87 (explaining the transaction is like a
lease that may be renewed at the end of each term).
37. See id. at 1086.
38. Nehf, supra note 30, at 804; see also Keest et al., supra note 31.
39. Hawkins, supra note 2, at 2054.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2055.
42. Id.
43. LACKO ET AL., supra note 1, at 47 tbl. 4.1.

44. Id.
45. Hawkins, supra note 2, at 2055.
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variety of preferred customer options. 4 6 The prospect of becoming a preferred customer may appeal to the urban poor, because they are eager to
acquire commodities and the status with which such commodities are associated. Preferred customer programs, which usually require paying a
fee, provide customers with extra benefits such as "theft and damage insurance[,] . . . sales and discounts, payment waivers, and the ability to

reinstate a terminated agreement at any time." 47 Industry representatives report that over half of the customers take a preferred customer
option.4 8
Under the basic agreement, the stores also charge a range of fees if the
customer does not comply with the original terms, which include "late
fees, reinstatement fees, and collection fees on delinquent accounts." 4 9
The fees can be and are used as a threat for the customer whose ardor for
a given commodity is waning.o For example, a store's salesman might
say, "Make your weekly or monthly payment and hold onto the commodity, but if you miss your payment you will be charged a late fee, or you
may even find your name turned over to a collection agency and may lose
the commodity anyway. "51
Overall, the rent-to-own business is an extremely profitable way to
take advantage of the urban poor, and the standardized, legally-binding
agreement is at the very heart of it. The central challenge to the agreement involves whether it should be classified as a lease or a credit sale. A
lease for personal property, such as a television, is a contract by which the
owner of the property grants to the lessee the right to possess, use, and
enjoy the property for a period of time in exchange for periodic payments, but without creating any debt and providing the consumer with
the option of returning the good. 52 In contrast, a credit sale involves the
customer as a buyer, rather than a renter. With credit sales, the original

46. Id.
47. Id. at 2056.
48. Id. (citing the example of RentONE's CARE Plus program).
49. Id.
50. Id. (arguing these fees prey on consumer's weaknesses such as procrastination,
while encouraging them to pay their rent so they do not have to forfeit their merchandise).
51. See Hawkins, supra note 2, at 2099 (explaining the significant role of procrastination in relation to the rent-to-own contract, which has roughly four times the potential of
causing customers to incur fees than credit cards).
52. See id. at 2047, 2051 (defining a lease in the context of renting or credit sale options); see also Nehf, supra note 30, at 756 (identifying a key feature of a lease is that it
does not create debt and "goods can be returned at any time with no further obligation,...
a benefit not available . . . under traditional credit contracts").

53. See Nehf, supra note 30, at 761 ("Congress ... [has] defined 'credit sale' to in-

clude: any contract in the form of a . .. lease if the ... lessee contracts to pay as compensa-

tion for use a surn substantially equivalent to or in excess of the aggregate value of the
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owner usually requires the buyer to make a down payment and then collects payment for the balance in installments paid over time. In return
for accepting installment payments, the seller charges interest and penalty fees, which help ensure that the sale is profitable, whether or not the
term is completed.55
With a lease as opposed to a credit sale, the operator of a rent-to-own
outlet is in a much better position. He or she can simply reclaim the
commodity if rental payments are not made in full, and the customer is
not awarded any of the value of the good. However, with a credit sale,
customers have a partial, legally-recognized interest in the goods, even if
they are unable to make all of their installment payments for the goods.
Additionally, credit sales provide customers rights to be given notice if
the goods are being re-sold, to redeem the goods, and get the surplus of
any goods sold.
Furthermore, if the conditional sale includes interest
5
payments, as is usually the case, there are federal consumer protection
laws and state usury laws requiring the disclosure of the terms and limiting interest rates.5
More will be said about litigation regarding this issue later in this article, but suffice it to say that even if courts recognize that rent-to-own
transactions are actually credit sales with the associated regulations, the
rent-to-own business is hardly doomed.6 0 With more regulations, the
business might become somewhat less profitable, but the business surely
remains viable given the longing for commodities that has been cultivated

property . . . and it is agreed that the . . . lessee will become, or for no other or a nominal

consideration has the option to become, the owner of the property upon full compliance
with his obligations under the contract.)."
54. Hawkins, supra note 2, at 2050.
55. Id. at 2056; see Nehf, supra note 30, at 761 (discussing that consumer representatives argue that rent-to-own agreements, although leases, are actually credit sales because
"the lessee [] become[s] the owner of the good automatically at the end of the lease without paying any additional consideration").
56. Hawkins, supra note 2, at 2049.
57. See id. (suggesting customers will be more likely to keep possession of rented
goods in bankruptcy if the transaction is a credit sale, which often allows a customer to
"retain ownership ... for less than . . . she owes").
58. Id.
59. See Truth in Lending Act of 1968, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1677 (2006) (providing protection to consumers who participate in credit sale transactions); see Hawkins, supra note
2, at 2048 (subjecting rent-to-own transactions to the Truth in Lending Act if the transactions are categorized as credit sales); Nehf, supra note 30, at 761 (discussing the legislative
climate and the consequences surrounding the debate of whether rent-to-own agreements
are leases or credit sales).
60. See generally Hawkins, supra note 2, at 2108-09 (commenting that current price
controls have not significantly harmed the rent-to-own industry because "the controls are
high enough to allow operator to function").
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among the urban poor. The local rent-to-loan outlet is a place in which
the urban poor seek to satisfy their desire for relatively expensive consumer goods. Ultimately, however, the reality is that rent-to-own outlets
"prey upon the financially illiterate in certain communities." 6 1
III.

A.

PAYDAY LENDING

The Rise of Payday Lending

Should rent-to-own customers be dissatisfied with the selection available at the local Rent-A-Center or simply want to shop at the same stores
as middle and upper-class Americans, they can turn to businesses for cash
to use for the purchase of commodities. Commonly known as "payday
lenders," these businesses are ubiquitous in inner-city neighborhoods.
While the payday lending business did not even exist as recently as
1990,62 there were as many as 25,000 outlets as of 2009.63
Payday lenders are specialized operators in what one scholar has described as contemporary society's "massive extension of consumer
credit." 64 In the aftermath of the recent recession, consumer borrowing
has surged, reaching its decade-high peak in March 2012.65 Indeed, the
recession and its aftermath make consumer borrowing even more likely.
According to Millan Mulraine, a strategist at TD Securities in New York,
"[w]hen the economy[ ] [is] not doing well, that[ I [is] when you want the
consumer to spend, and if it means borrowing to do that, then that certainly would be encouraged[.]" 66
Prominent banks are complicit in this practice of borrowing from payday lenders. The different types of lenders in the United States are interconnected. 67 Banks such as JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and
Wells Fargo are critical in the operation of payday lenders. 6 8 These banks
61. See Opinion, supra note 14 (quoting Taharka Robinson, a consumer advocate in
Brooklyn, New York).
62. Kim Christensen, Payday Loans Mushroom Among Middle Class, TRIBLIVE, Jan.
11, 2009, http://triblive.com/x/pittsburghtribibusiness/s_606566.html#axzz2fkXVQZEH.
63. Id.
64. Dunn, supra note 27, at 123.
65. Meera Louis, Consumer Credit in U.S. Increasesby Most in 10 Years, BLOOMBERG
(May 7, 2012, 2:32 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-07/consumer-credit-in-us-rose-in-march-by-most-in-over-10-years.html.
66. Michelle Jamrisko, Consumer Credit in U.S. Rises by $17.1 Billion, Fed Says,
BLOOMBERG (July 9, 2012, 3:09 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-09/consumer-credit-in-u-s-jumped-by-17-1-billion-in-may-fed-says.html.
67. Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Major Banks Aid in Payday Loans Banned by States,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/24/business/major-banks-aidin-payday-loans-banned-by-states.html?pagewanted=all& r=0 (stating "major banks have
... become behind-the-scenes allies of Internet-based payday lenders").
68. Id.
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allow the payday lenders to withdraw payments automatically from their
customers' checking accounts, even in those states that prohibit payday
lending.69
In their defense, the traditional banks say they are merely "serving
[their] customers who have authorized the [payday] lenders to withdraw
money from their accounts" in order to pay off the loans.7 0 In the overall
scheme of things, the banks' actions might seem trivial; however, the payday customers are often operating close to their personal financial margins." The withdrawals often cause overdrafts, for which substantial fees
are charged. 72 According to a report from the Pew Charitable Trust,
"[r]oughly [twenty-seven] percent of payday loan borrowers say that the
loans caused them to overdraw their accounts .

. . .

Payday lenders themselves, meanwhile, are thriving because they provide quick and easy loans for those strapped for cash.7 4 in general, a
payday borrower need not necessarily have a job or a "payday." A
would-be borrower only needs a checking account and identification in
the form of a driver's license, passport, pay stub, bank statement, or even
a telephone bill.7 ' Lenders do not conduct a credit check or ask for references, and, indeed, some boast of how quickly they can process a loan
application.7' For example, a payday lender may promise to get the customer "[in and out the door in five minutes with no hassles." 77

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id. (explaining processing automatic withdrawals may not appear to be a
source of profit, but because many customers are already on shaky financial footing, withdrawals often cause customers to incur a succession of additional fees).
72. Id.
73. Silver-Greenberg, supra note 67.
74. See PEW CHARITABLE TRusrs, PAYDAY LENDING IN AMERICA: WiIo BORROWS,
WHERE THEY BORROW, AND Wiiv 2, 4 (2012) (reporting that twelve million adults use
payday loans in a given year and that a typical borrower requests a loan of $375 and spends
approximately $520 on interest and fees). In their report, the Pew Charitable Trust also
estimated that "payday loan borrowers spend approximately $7.4 billion annually at 20,000
storefronts and hundreds of websites . . . ." Id. at 2; see also Robert Faturechi, Payday
Lenders Giving Advances on Unemployment Checks, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2010, http://arti
cles.latimes.com/2010/mar/01/business/la-fi-paydayl-2010marOl (noting that the use of payday loans is increasing as people struggle to make financial ends meet).
75. See Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87
MINN. L. REV. 1, 9 (2002) (applying for a payday loan usually requires several forms of
identification but can be obtained quickly).
76. Id.
77. Id.
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Business Model

As is true with rent-to-own transactions, a well-crafted, standardized
contractual agreement is at the heart of payday loans. Under the terms
of the loan agreement, a borrower provides a signed check for the
amount of the loan he or she wants, plus a stipulated fee." The fee is
usually a percentage of the loan.7 9 The lender then agrees to keep the
check, knowing in advance that it is highly unlikely that funds will be
available in the borrower's checking account to cover the amount of the
check.so After all, why would borrowers even turn to a payday lender if
they could simply take the funds from an existing account?"
The loan agreement includes a maturity date a few weeks or perhaps a
month subsequent to the date on which the agreement was signed. On
the date the loan matures, the borrower has three options: (1) pay off the
amount of the loan with cash or a money order; (2) allow the payday
lender to cash the check (usually through one of the previously-mentioned traditional banks); or (3) pay an additional fee to renew the loan.82
Payday lenders have a strong preference for the third option, which in
effect amounts to a refinancing of the loan at the same high rate that was
officially stipulated." Such refinancing is known in the business as a "rollover" and is quite common.8 4 According to the Center for Responsible
Lending, the average payday loan is refinanced eight times." Rollovers
are in fact the key to generating profits in the payday lending business
model.86
The total cost of refinancing often vastly exceeds the original loan
amount, because rollovers extend the period set for repayment under the

78. Mendenhall, supra note 2, at 305.
79. Id. at 305 ("'Fees charged for payday loans are usually a percentage of the face
value of the check or a fee charged per amount borrowed-say, for every $50 or $100
loaned."').
80. Id. (explaining the lender usually agrees to hold the check until the borrower's
next paycheck, which is usually two weeks).
81. See generally id. at 329-30 (claiming consumers are easily susceptible to the dangerous and predatory practices of payday lenders because they are not aware of the alternative credit opportunities, such as, "negotiat[ing] a payment plan with creditors[,] . . .
[using] credit cards or secured credit cards[,] ...

use of credit unions[,] ...

advances from

employers, overdraft protection, and lines of credit from finance lenders").
82. Id. at 305.
83. See id. (explaining that refinancing the loan increases the cost of the loan, resulting in greater profits for payday lenders).
84. Id.
85. Christensen, supra note 62.
86. Mendenhall, supra note 2, at 309 (noting "[1]oan flipping (extensions, rollovers or
back to back transactions)" account for "90 [percent] of the payday industry's revenue
growth").
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original agreement, and can be conducted again and again. In the previously mentioned calculations from the Center for Responsible Lending,
the average payday loan indebtedness among borrowers jumps from $325
to $793 because of rollovers." Additionally, Nathalie Martin, a consumer and bankruptcy law professor at the University of New Mexico
who has studied payday lending, finds that "[w]hile the going rate is between 400 and 600[ ] [percent] per annum, some payday loans exceed
1,000[ ][percent] per annum."88
In the end, many borrowers are no more able to pay the mushrooming
fees than they are able to pay back the loan." At this point, payday
lenders may implement various collection practices, including: harassment, threats of violence, collecting excessive damages, and threatening
criminal prosecution.o Lawsuits have particularly grave consequences
for defaulting borrowers because courts tend to award lenders excessive
damages.91
There are several reasons payday loan borrowers might be more willing to tolerate distasteful, aggressive collections practices. First, the typical payday loan borrower tends to be financially disadvantaged. 92
Because of their poverty, the poor have limited social capital and virtually nothing in the way of back-up or emergency funds.93 Furthermore,
they have, in a sense, become accustomed to rude treatment from neigh-

87. Christensen, supra note 62.
88. Nathalie Martin, Regulating Payday Loans: Why This Should Make the CFPB's
Short List, 2 HARV. Bus. L. REv. ONuNI'

44, 46 (2011), available at http://www.hblr.org/

wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Martin-Payday-Loans.pdf.
89. Mendenhall, supra note 2, at 310 (claiming payday lending is a predatory business
model whose "lending practices put borrowers deeper and deeper in debt with little to no
chance to fully repay the entire loan amount").
90. Johnson, supra note 75, at 78.
91. See id. at 78-80 (showing that courts tend to reward treble damages).
92. See Jane Cover et al., Minorities on the Margins? The Spatial Organization of
Fringe Banking Services, 33 J. URB. AFi. 317, 319 (2011) (stating the urban poor are a
"population that has not been well served by traditional banks"); see also Alice Gallmeyer
& Wade T. Roberts, Payday Lenders and Economically Distressed Communities: A Spatial
Analysis of FinancialPredation,46 Soc. Sci. J. 521, 522 (2009), available at http://wikis.uit
.tufts.edu/confluence/download/attachments/281 63599/Hoopes+Assn+1 +Article.pdf
(claiming "payday lending outlets serve as an indicator of community economic distress,
just as they function as an exacerbating factor in that distress").
93. See CHRISTIAAN GROOTAERT, ET AL., WORLD BANK, MEASURING SoCIAL CAPITAL: AN INTEGRATED1 QUESTIONNAIRE 3 (2004) (explaining that social capital refers to the

resources that individuals are able to obtain through their relationships with others).
Those who occupy strategic positions in society and have ties to important groups have
greater access to social capital. Id. at 3. The poor have limited access to social capital. Id.
at I ("providing a set of empirical tools for measuring social capital[ ]" for the purpose of
improving the "knowledge of the social dimensions of economic development ... and
implement[ing] more effective poverty reduction strategies").
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borhood merchants and from government officials.9 4 If a collections
agent complains about a deadbeat debtor to a borrower's relatives or
threatens to report the debtor to the police, what else is new?
C.

Attempts to Rationalize Payday Lending

Payday lenders defend their targeting of the urban poor by saying it
makes funds available for those who cannot turn to banks and traditional
lenders." Defenders of payday lenders know these borrowers are often
impoverished and concentrated in minority neighborhoods, but according
to the champions of payday lending, these people should be as free as
other Americans to consume to their hearts' content." It would be paternalistic to take payday lending away from borrowers who have knowingly decided to pay huge amounts for the loans they need for their
purchases.97
94. See
AND

DEEPA NARAYAN, WORLD BANK, BONDS AND BRIDGEs: SOCIAL CAPITAL
POVERTY 4 (1999), available at http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/9747/

narayan.pdf(discussing that certain groups are not just excluded from access to resources
but experience exclusion in all areas of society-social, economic, cultural and political).
95. Tom Lehman, The Argument In Favor of Payday Lending, MARKETPLACE.
(Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.marketplace.org/topicslyour-money/commentary/argumentfavor-payday-lending (claiming that "banning payday lending ... does more harm than
good by restricting credit options for households with no other recourse for loans"); Richard Eskow, Usurious Payday Loans: Myths, Flawed Studies, and Solutions, HuFF PosTr
Poorics (May 12, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rj-eskow/usurious-payday-loansmyt-b_573542.html (asserting the argument by defenders of payday lending that "payday
loans serve a group of people that can't get needed loans any other way[ ]" is a myth).
96. See Rebekah Coleman, The Hidden Yet Positive Side of Payday Lending, LOANS
.ORG (June 28, 2013, 12:12 PM), http://loans.org/payday/articles/hidden-positive-side-cashadvance (stating defenders such as law professor Dr. Paige Skiba find payday loans have
positive and negative aspects just like "credit cards, mortgage loans, and student loans");
Eskow, supra note 95 (explaining that payday lending disproportionately exploits minorities and that "lenders know exactly what they fare] doing when they trap people into a long
term debt cycle . . ."); Lehman, supra note 95 ("[D]efending the right of individuals to
make voluntary choices in the marketplace . . . [and] argufing] that financial resources are
more productively employed when they are allocated by the voluntary forces of supply and
demand."); Donald P. Morgan & Kevin J. Pan, Do Payday Lenders Target Minorities?,
FED. RES. BANK OF NEW YORK (Feb. 8, 2012), http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed

.org/2012/02/do-payday-lenders-target-minorities.html (finding "blacks and Hispanics are
not significantly more likely to use payday credit than are whites[ ]" and stating that the
key determinant of whether they will use payday lending services is their likelihood of
experiencing credit problems, not their race).
97. See Tim Miller, PaternalismOut to Kill Key Loan Options, SUN-SENTINEL, May 6,
2008, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2008-05-06/news/0805050210_1_payday-lending-researchers-borrower (defending payday loans and promoting the idea that adults are responsible for caring for themselves and are capable of making their own debt-management
decisions). Paternalism is "the belief that adults do not possess the ability to take care of
themselves" and is a driving force behind state legislatures' efforts to ban payday-lending
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This pitch has been supported by some conservative economists. For
example, Paige Marta Skiba has argued, "[C]redit in general allows consumers to smooth consumption over time, meaning that they borrow
from future good times to help make it through current tough times.""
Such "smoothing" is common, the argument goes, and society thinks little
of it when students acquire loans to pay college bills, small business owners borrow to make business improvements, or consumers use credit to
buy durable goods." Yet, when payday lenders make their loans, their
conduct seems immoral and usurious. 100 "While triple-digit interest rates
may sound outrageous," Skiba says, "borrowing against future paychecks
at such a high APR can be worth it if consumers' marginal utility is raised
sufficiently to outweigh the expenditure they will make on interest." 01
Unfortunately, business spokesmen and conservative economists do
not satisfactorily acknowledge that payday lending is consciously geared
to putting the urban poor into ever-larger debt as they struggle to pay
their rollover fees and loans. Payday lending uses standardized loan
agreements to drive borrowers into worse poverty by getting them onto
what consumer law attorneys Lynn Drysdale and Kathleen E. Keest have
described as "at best, a 'debt treadmill' or, at worst, a downward spiral."' 0 2 Payday lenders know most borrowers will not pay back their
loans in a timely fashion.' 0 The borrowers ride the treadmill by borrowing again and again.104

services. Id. (noting if "[u]sed responsibly, payday lending can help a borrower stave off
financial calamity").
98. Paige Marta Skiba, Regulation of Payday Loans: Misguided?, 69 WAsh. & LEE L.
REv. 1023, 1026 (2012).
99. Id. at 1026-27.
100. See id. at 1027 (stating that lawmakers look down on payday loans but fail to
consider the benefits of credit and that payday loans are the only form of credit available
to many consumers). Skiba also claims that "there is little evidence that payday loans per
se are unequivocally bad for borrowers or that consumers overall are better off without
access to payday loans." Id.
101. Id.
102. Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer FinancialServices Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenges to Current Thinking
About the Role of Usury Laws in Today's Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589, 605 (2000).
103. See Mendenhall, supra note 2, at 311 (noting that, contrary to what lenders say,
"payday loans are rarely one-time occurrences used for unexpected emergencies and expenses" and the borrower tends to struggle to pay off the loan within the loan period
because of the excessively high interest rates).
104. Id. (describing that payday loans often put borrowers on a "debt treadmill" because the borrower cannot pay off the loan at the end of the loan period, and then, because
of taking out another loan or loan fees, they are unable to make the next payment without
taking out another loan or paying another fee-creating "a never-ending cycle putting consumers on a perpetual debt treadmill").
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The net effect of this is to worsen the urban poor's already unenviable
economic position. Attorney Shane M. Mendenhall concludes, "In effect,
the payday loan industry is single-handedly broadening the gap between
the wealthy and the poor. Because payday loan borrowers are not even
able to live paycheck to paycheck, they are falling further below the poverty line."'
To that end, the economic situation of some payday borrowers has become so bad that one scholar compares it to peonage.' 0 6
IV.
A.

TITLE PAWNS

Significance of Vehicles for the Urban Poor

Many members of the urban poor have still another financing option
for their commodity purchases: the title pawn. It might be located just
down the block from the payday lender, and in fact, payday lenders also
sometimes offer title loans.' 0 7 Regardless of location, title pawns are prepared to provide high-interest loans if would-be borrowers can produce
the title to a motor vehicle.10 s The security agreement of title pawns is
geared to ensnare the urban poor, or at least that subcategory of the urban poor with motor vehicles.' 0 9 To say the title pawn business is thriving
is an understatement. In Florida, one of the states in which title pawns
are most entrenched, lenders write $225 million in loans annually."o
A motor vehicle or, better put, the lack thereof, is a major factor in the
previously mentioned pattern of the poor paying more for everything
105. Id. at 330-31.
106. Zoe Elizabeth Lees, Note, Payday Peonage: Thirteenth Amendment Implications
in Payday Lending, 15 SCIIoItAiR 63, 66 (2012). Peonage is "the use of laborers bound in
servitude because of debt." Dictionary - Peonage, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/peonage (last visited Oct. 24, 2013). "[I]n 1865, the Thirteenth Amendment prohibited the institution of ... slavery in the United States." Lees,
supra, at 67.
107. See Paul Kiel, How Payday Lenders Bounce Back When States Crackdown, Huive
PosT BUSINEss, (Aug. 6, 2013, 4:55 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/06/payday-lenders n_3715116.html (finding that many payday loan lenders now offer auto-title
loans to avoid regulations).
108. Nathalie Martin & Ozymandias Adams, Grand Theft Auto Loans: Repossession
and Demographic Realitiesin Title Lending, 77 Mo. L. REv. 41, 42 (2012) ("A title loan is a
high-interest, deeply over-secured consumer loan, in which the consumer uses an unencumbered automobile as collateral for a non-purchase money loan.").
109. Id. at 43 (providing empirical data challenging the truth in title lenders' typical
claims that they "rarely repossess borrowers' cars[,] [that] consumers understand the terms
of these loans .. . and that their clientele is largely middle class"). Data from New Mexico
shows "that the average borrower makes between $20,116 and $27,719" while the poverty
line for a family of four is $21,200. Id. at 77 tbl.12.1, 85 (showing the industry's "claim that
a majority of their customers are middle class[ ]" is false). Data from other states is similar,
thus "discarding this middle class urban legend." Id. at 85.
110. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 102, at 600.
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from food to high-priced consumer goods."' One study conducted in
Buffalo, New York found that a major factor affecting a consumer's
search for lower prices on consumer goods is "not her residential area or
12
Bufthe poverty level per se[,] but whether or not she owns a car."'

falo's poor without motor vehicles are only twenty-five percent as likely
to actively search for lower prices than either non-poor or poor households with a car.' 13 Not surprisingly, most of those unable to search for
lower prices end up paying more." 4
In addition to providing the ability to comparison shop, a motor vehicle
is crucial when it comes to finding and maintaining employment. The
most common jobs for the urban poor are in fast-food restaurants and
malls, and these jobs for the most part are not within walking distance of
where the urban poor live. According to the Brookings Institution's Metropolitan Policy Program, "[i]n the nation's 100 largest metropolitan areas, nearly half of all the jobs lie more than [ten] miles from the
downtown core[.]" 11 5 A second Brookings Institution study reveals,
"[T]he typical job in major metro areas is accessible to only [twentyseven] percent of all working age adults within an hour-and-a-half commute on public transportation." 116
As if these figures are not sobering enough, the urban mass transit systems to which the working poor might turn are in severe decline. "A
decades-long trend of prioritizing automobile use at the expense of public
transportation has undercut an important means of improving the lives of
low-income Americans .

.

. in urban areas.""

As a result, the working

poor turn to motor vehicles to get to work, and "[a] very large proportion

111. See Brown, supra note 7 (discussing why the poor pay more and the effects that
not having a car have on the poor's access to lower priced consumer goods).
112. Debrabrata Talukdar, Cost of Being Poor: Retail Price and Consumer Price
Search Differences across Inner-City and Suburban Neighborhoods, 35 J. CONSUMER RES.
457, 467 (2008) (finding that prices are two to five percent higher in poor areas and identifying one's access to a car as "a key determinant of consumers' price search patterns").
113. Id.
114. Id. The "proportion [] of residents without cars is considerably higher in innercity areas, which are also characterized by an increasingly weakened competitive environment dominated by cost-inefficient corner stores[,]" and this lack of access to cost-efficient,
large grocery stores is due to their limited mobility and the limited presence of such stores
in their neighborhoods. Id.
115. Peter S. Goodman, Unemployment Problem Includes Public TransportationThat
Separates Poor from Jobs, HuFF Post BUSINEsS (July 11, 2012, 7:16 AM), http://www.huff
intonpost.com/2012/07/11/unemployment-problem-includes-public-transportation n-16603
44.html.
116. Id.
117. Patrick Moulding, Comment, Fare or Unfair? The Importance of Mass Transit
155, 155 (2005).
for America's Poor, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. AND Po'
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of the U.S. workers who live in poorer households (and who do have
cars) do [in fact] drive to work.""
Given our reliance on cars to get to work, it is risky for the working
poor to turn to title pawns to finance their commodity purchases. It
"clouds the title" of the working poor's most valuable asset and jeopardizes the working poor's employment. Title pawns are hardly the only
reason why so many men and women from impoverished urban areas lose
what were lousy jobs in the first place, but title pawns are a contributing
factor to unemployment.' 19
Thus, title loan lenders are partially responsible for some portion of the
working poor becoming just poor. According to William White, senior
vice president of the nation's largest pawn chain, "[slomebody forfeits
their VCR-life goes on. But you lose your car-that's a different ballgame. Now you're talking about somebody's livelihood[.]"120
B.

Business Model

The distinction might be lost on the average borrower, but the agreement at the center of the title pawn business is a particular type of security agreement.121 When entering into a security agreement, a party offers
collateral to back up his or her promise to make payments that are becoming due or to pay off a loan.122 If the party does not pay in a timely
manner, the lender can claim all or at least part of the collateral.123 The
collateral is the source of the lender's security.

118. Id. at 165.

119. See AMANDA QUESTER & JEAN ANN Fox, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING &
CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., CAR TITLE LENDING: DRIVING BORROWERS TO FINANCIAL
RUIN 17 (2005) ("States that permit lending should vigilantly monitor title loan companies'
operations and pursue violations[ ]" because there is "no way to determine how many
loans are made, how many end in default, or how many borrowers lose their cars to repossession and, consequently, their jobs because they can no longer get to work.").

120. Joseph B. Cahill, License to Owe: Title-Loan Firms Offer Car Owners a Solution
That Often Backfires, WALL STREET J., May 1999, http://info.wsj.com/classroom/archive/
wsjce.99may.ymm.html.
121. QUESTER & Fox, supra note 119, at 4 ("The borrower generally keeps possession

of the car during the term of the loan, but leaves the title with the lender as security for
repayment of the loan.").

122. Todd J. Zywicki, Consumer Use and Government Regulation of Title Pledge
Lending, 22 Loy. CONSUMER L. RFv. 425, 433 (2010) ("The lender holds as collateral the
title to the borrower's car and/or either a copy of the keys to the car or a device that
permits the title lender to disable the car's ignition.").
123. Id. "The amount the lender will lend against the collateral varies: some studies
have found that lenders typically will lend about 33% of the resale value of the automobile;
others have found a typical loan value of 50-55% and even up to 100% of the value of the
car." Id.
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A classic example of a security agreement is the one between a customer and a pawnbroker; however, pawnbrokers take personal property
only as collateral and do not take title to the personal property. 1 24 CUStomers in need of quick cash can bring their valuable possessions-jewelry, televisions, musical instruments, and the like-to the pawnbroker,
who would provide cash while holding onto the possessions. 125 The customer can then reclaim the possessions by buying them out of hock at a
higher price.12 6 The pawnbroker, meanwhile, has the option of selling the
possessions to a third party if reclamation is not forthcoming.127 Historically, some thought pawnbrokers dealt primarily in stolen goods, and this
presumption, along with the image of desperate debtors pleading for just
a little more cash from the pawnbroker, tarnished the collective reputation of the business.128 The business declined only to experience a revival
in the present with national chains. 2 9
As previously noted, under the terms of a title pawn's security agreement, the borrower does not turn over his or her motor vehicle, but
rather uses the vehicle's title to secure the loan from the lender. 3 o Legally speaking, title to a motor vehicle signifies that the holder has owner-

124. Jarret C. Oeltjen, FloridaPawnbroking:An Industry in Transition, 22 FiLA. ST. U.
L. RiEV. 995, 996-97 (1996) (limiting "pawns" to tangible personal property).
125. Pawnshop 101: How Pawnshops Work, Tmn, FUN TIMs Guijow, http://savingmoney.thefuntimesguide.com/2010/05/pawnshops.php (last visited Oct. 25, 2013) (explaining that pawnshops provide short-term loans for those who do not have good credit).
An individual takes an item to the pawnshop as collateral in exchange for money. Id. If
the loan is paid back in time, they get their property back. Id.
126. Id. (explaining the original owner may buy back the item for whatever price the
pawnbroker wants).
127. Oeltjen, supra note 124, at 996 ("[A] 'pawn' [is] . . . a bailment of personal property as security for payment of a debt for which the holders of the property have an implied power of sale on default."); Pawnshop 101: How Pawnshops Work, supra note 125
(explaining if the borrower does not pay back the loan in time the item becomes the property of the pawnbroker who can sell it to pay off the loan). The pawnshop usually has to
keep the item for three to four months as collateral before they can sell it. Id.
128. Oeltjen, supra note 124, at 995-96.
129. See Getting Rid of Pawn Shop Stereotypes, SAN DIEGo LuxURY PAWN SioP REPORT (Apr. 26, 2009), http://sandiegojewelrypawnshops.com/blog/2009/04/26/getting-rid-ofpawn-shop-stereotypes/ ("Pawn shops are often confused with buy-and-sell shops, which

are [not] regulated and can often serve as a way for criminals to get fast cash for stolen
goods[ ] . . . ."); see also Marissa Gwidt, Pawnshops Struggle with Negative Labels, Battle
Image of eBay, DAILY ILLINI (Sept. 28, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.dailyillini.com/fea
tures/article_fOa5ba42-5ff4-541c-9154-38b2f7ccf82c.htmi (stating the negative labels of
pawn shops include "shady places where crack-heads go ... [and] unregulated, dirty stores
shelved with stolen, inoperative products").
130. Zywicki, supra note 122, at 433.
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ship of the vehicle.' 3 1 In addition to taking the title, or at least a copy of
it, some title pawns require a set of keys for the motor vehicle in order to
facilitate taking possession of it should the borrower fail to make

payments.13 2
It appears that the viability and size of the title loan depends more on
the value of the motor vehicle offered as collateral than on the credit
history of the borrower. 3 3 The loan can be for anything between onethird and two-thirds of the resale value of the motor vehicle, although
there are instances in which title loans are made for the entire value of

the car.13 4

The typical title loan is relatively small-$250 to $1,000-and repayment is usually due after one month.13 However, as is the case with
payday borrowers, customers at title pawns are frequently unable to pay
back the loans by the end of the stipulated period.' 36 The title pawn is
then only too happy to allow the loan to roll over for another month,
charging a new fee for this option.'
In fact, unlike rent-to-own outlets,
at which customers in effect renew their transaction frequently, some title
pawns are able to renew the agreement automatically, and the borrower
does not even have to return to the lender's office to sign additional
papers.'3 8
Rollovers can and do occur repeatedly, resulting in what amounts to an
extraordinary interest rate as the borrower rides a "debt treadmill" into
tighter and tighter financial straits. Surveys of borrowers from title
pawns have found they routinely pay triple-digit interest rates, and many
borrowers end up paying back appreciably more in interest than they borrowed at the outset.'3 9 Indeed, there are reported instances of borrowers
paying over 900 percent in interest."o However, should borrowers real-

131. See Martin & Adams, supra note 108 (explaining the role of the unencumbered
vehicle title in securing a title loan from a lender).
132. Zywicki, supra note 122.
133. Id. (stating lenders focus on the value of the car and do not uniformly verify
employment, income, or credit history).
134. Id.
135. See id. (discussing the findings of the Tennessee Department of Financial Institutions' 2008 report on the title pledge industry).
136. See QUESTER & Fox, supra note 119, at 6 (citing examples of people unable to
pay back their loans).
137. See id. at 6-7 (quoting a study from Missouri that shows lenders make 3.5 times
more from renewal loans per month than from new loans).
138. See generally JEAN ANN Fox & ELIZABETH Guy, CONSUMER FED'N OF AM.,
DRIVEN INTO DEBT: CFA CAR TITLE LOAN STORE AND ONLINE SURVEY (2005) (explor-

ing renewal methods and availability of title loans online).
139. QUES1-FR & Fox, supra note 119, at 5 (giving examples of surveys that found
triple-digit rates in Missouri, Illinois, and Florida).
140. Id. at n.24.
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ize how outrageous the interest is, the borrowers might be hard-pressed
to challenge things in court because many resourceful title pawns insert
binding mandatory arbitration clauses in the security agreement in order
to prevent borrowers from mounting a class action.14 1
If the borrower cannot make the interest payments, or perhaps simply
wants to get off the "debt treadmill," the security agreement enables the
title pawn to take possession of the motor vehicle.1 4 2 For instance, in
Tennessee, fourteen to seventeen percent of borrowers are unable to
make their payments, and title pawns take possession of roughly half of
the motor vehicles to which they are entitled.1 43 Vehicles obtained in this
manner can be routed to used car auctions or to used car lots, some of
which are owned by the title lender. 14 4 As for the other half of the motor
vehicles, many have serious mechanical problems or structural damage. 14 5 Some have been totaled or junked. Others quite simply were not
worth that much at the outset of the borrowing process. 4 6 In all of these
cases, the title pawn makes the business decision that the cost of taking
possession and trying to re-sell the motor vehicle is greater than what
might be received through a resale.14 7
C.

Defenses of the Title Pawn Industry

As is true with rent-to-own operators and payday lenders, title pawns
have their defenders. One of the arguments supporting title pawns is that
the borrowers would pay even more if they had to turn to "other inferior
forms of credit." 148 According to Todd J. Zywicki, a commercial and
bankruptcy law professor at George Mason University School of Law and
senior scholar in economics at the Mercatus Center at George Mason
University, "If deprived access to title loans, many consumers would sub-

141. Id. at 4-5.
142. Id. at 4.
143. Zywicki, supra note 122, at 435 n.29.
144. See Drysdale & Keest, supra note 102, at 600 (explaining title lenders often obtain used car dealer licenses or simply have the cars auctioned off, and depending on the
state's 'pawn' laws may not have to return any surpluses from the sale of the pawned item
to the customer).
145. Zywicki, supra note 122, at 435.
146. See id. (stating that at the time vehicles are pledged, they are roughly eleven
years old and have an average of 90,823 miles).
147. Id. (explaining repossession expenses can amount to about twenty percent of operating revenues).
148. Jim Hawkins, Credit on Wheels: The Law and Business of Auto-Title Lending, 69
WASI. & Lium L. Ri-v. 535, 590 (2012).
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stitute less-preferred sources of credit or risk losing access to credit

altogether."14 9
Some scholars also argue that borrowers who turn to title pawns are
not necessarily ensnared like unsuspecting animals in a trap. Rather, they
are informed borrowers making intelligent, rational decisions to "use ...
title loans to meet short-term emergency liquidity crises . . . [or] . . . use

title loans to finance small business operations." 5 0 However, it is hard to
believe that a poor borrower who drives straight from the title pawn to
Walmart, or maybe even Rent-A-Center, is using the loan to relieve a
mortgage crisis or pursue a business opportunity.
A major blind spot among the defenders of title pawns is their failure
to appreciate how much the industry focuses on the urban poor. Defenders of the industry might like to believe a large portion of title pawn customers belong to the middle class, or perhaps are small businessmen, but
in reality, many are poor and lusting for commodities."' Nathalie Martin
and Ernesto Longa, law professors at the University of New Mexico
School of Law, have analyzed data from several sources and have found
that in Illinois title loan customers earn an average annual salary of
$19,808, and in New Mexico the average borrower makes between
$20,116 and $27,719.152 This reveals that most borrowers are not middle
class, but rather are "near or below the poverty line."'
Title pawns know that their typical borrowers "can ill afford such highcost, short-term balloon loans . . . ."1'

Poor borrowers are especially

unlikely to be able to pay back the loans and are especially likely to incur
extraordinarily high interest charges.15 5 "Borrowers across the country
find themselves sucked into a spiral of debt, paying more and more fees
while the principle on the loan remains largely unchanged."15 When al149. Zywicki, supra note 122, at 427 (claiming "there is no evidence that title lenders
are earning supernormal economic profits ... " and promoting title lending as an important
source of credit that benefits the economy overall).
150. Hawkins, supra note 148.
151. Nathalie Martin & Ernesto Longa, High-Interest Loans and Class: Do Payday
and Title Loans Really Serve the Middle Class?, 24 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 524, 550-52
(2012) (examining data from New Mexico and Illinois and finding that the average title
loan customer earns approximately $20,000 annually and that alternative financial service
providers are "most commonly located in low-income neighborhoods with moderate
poverty").
152. Id. at 550.
153. Id.
154. QUESTER & Fox, supra note 119, at 6.
155. Id. "[M]any borrowers pay only the accrued interest charges while rolling over
the principal amount into a new loan with additional exorbitant fees." Id. "In Oregon,
[nineteen percent] of title loans that were paid off in May 2002 had been renewed six times
prior to payoff." Id.
156 Id-
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ready-impoverished borrowers sign the dotted line of a security agreement at a title pawn, they have not found a way out of a financial pinch,
but rather have begun a process by which the pinch will become more
and more painful.
V.

REFORM

Given the exploitative features of rent-to-own, payday lending, and title pawn business practices and their contractual agreements, they have
attracted the ire of consumer advocates and community activists.15' Litigation and lobbying in legislatures have followed, often resulting in reforms of the businesses.15 8 However, although some limited victories
have been won because of these reform efforts, the exploitation continues, and the victories have a Pyrrhic character which legitimizes these
suspect businesses. 15 9
A.

Litigation

The most important litigation has involved defining how to conceptualize the rent-to-own, payday lending, and title pawn businesses in a legal
sense. In the rent-to-own arena, litigation between Hilda Perez and a
New Jersey rent-to-own outlet has attracted significant attention. 160 In
2001 and 2002, Perez launched five rent-to-own transactions at a local
Rent-A-Center to acquire furniture, a washer and dryer, a DVD player, a
computer, and a large television with cabinet.' 6 ' She signed a standardized agreement for each acquisition.162 The agreement required her to
157. See e.g., Ashlee Rezin, Consumer Advocates Say Payday Lending Worsens Debt,
Callfor FederalBan, PROGRESS ILLINOIS (June 7, 2013, 10:11 AM), http://www.progressillinois.com/quick-hits/content/2013/06/06/consumer-advocates-say-payday-lending-worsensdebt-call-federal-ban (examining efforts of consumer advocacy groups in Illinois to prohibit payday lenders and highlighting legislation proposed by Democratic Senator Dick
Durbin to regulate the industry).
158. See e.g., Paul Kiel, Whack-a-Mole: How Payday Lenders Bounce Back When
States Crack Down, PRO PUBLICA (Aug. 6, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/how-payday-lenders-bounce-back-when-states-crack-down (describing the progress and
setbacks experienced by state legislatures in their efforts to restrict payday lending).
159. See e.g., Jim Siegel, Lenders Skirt State Laws on Payday Loans, CoLuMBus DisPATCH, Aug. 7, 2013, http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2013/08/07/lendersskirt-state-laws-on-payday-loans.html (describing how there were still hundreds of payday
lending stores conducting business in Ohio in 2013, in spite of passing legislation five years
prior).
160. See Perez v. Rent-A-Ctr., Inc., 892 A.2d 1255, 1255 (N.J. 2006) (detailing a class
action lawsuit wherein the plaintiff filed suit on behalf of herself and thousands of others
claiming Rent-A-Center contracts violated the Consumer Fraud Act and the Retail Installment Act by charging interest rates in excess of statutory allowances).
161. Id. at 1258.
162. Id. at 1259-60.
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make weekly payments on the various goodS163 and subjected her to penalty fees if payments were not made.' 6 4 The top of each agreement read:
"THIS IS A RENTAL AGREEMENT ONLY." 16 5 Rent-A-Center repeated the statement and noted: "We own the property you are
renting."' 66
The consumer goods Perez "rented" had a cash value of $9,301.72.167
However, if Perez had somehow been able to make all her weekly payments on the goods, she would have paid a total of $18,613.32-a markup
of over 100 percent-thanks to the payment scheme and added interest. 16 8 Perez stopped making payments well before she could claim to
have purchased the goods,'16 9 although one must wonder if there was any
chance she could actually "rent" the goods for long enough to ever "own"
them.
Perez sued, arguing the agreements were not rental leases, but rather
were retail installment contracts covered under the Retail Installment
Sales Act (RISA), which she claimed imposed a thirty percent cap on
interest rates for retail installment contract.170 She lost before the trial
court and the lower-level appellate court, but the New Jersey Supreme
Court ruled in her favor, holding the agreement was not a rental agreement but an installment sale.
Justice Virginia Long discussed at great length the manner in which the
goods were sold and acquired.1 72 Perez's expert witness, actuary James
Hunt, calculated the annual interest rates on selected goods purchased by
Perez as follows:
Washer and Dryer
79.9%
Furniture
82.7%
79.2% to 82.7%173
DVD Player
These figures convinced Justice Long and a majority of the New Jersey
Supreme Court that the Rent-A-Center "rental" really amounted to a
high-interest installment sale. Thus, they concluded that Perez's agree-

163. Id. at 1260.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1259.
166. Perez, 892 A.2d at 1259.
167. Id. at 1260.
168. Id.
169. Id. (finding Perez stopped making payments in 2002 after paying $8,156.72).
170. Id. at 1263 ("RISA does not expressly contain an interest rate cap[ ] ... [however,] it is the vehicle through which the legislature imposed the [thirty percent] cap in the
criminal usury statute on retail installment sales.").
171. Id. at 1260-61, 1268, 1275.
172. Perez, 892 A.2d at 1265-70.
173. Id. at 1260.
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ment with Rent-A-Center was covered by New Jersey's Retail Installment Sales Act (RISA) and was in violation of the state's criminal usury
statute because the interest was higher than allowed. 17 4
Decisions regarding payday lending and title pawns have not been as
dramatic and pointed as the Perez decision regarding the rent-to-own
business, but these decisions have in their own way clarified how these
businesses might be conceptualized. In general, payday lending decisions
have rejected the claim of payday lenders that they should be seen merely
as providers of check-cashing services rather than as lenders, a claim
which would free the payday lenders from limits imposed by state usury
laws."' The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, for
example, found payday lending was in fact a loan-making enterprise and
subject to the state's usury laws.176 In later litigation, the Kentucky Supreme Court agreed with this interpretation.1 77
Title pawns, meanwhile, have argued that they are the equivalent of
traditional pawnbrokers in hope of claiming the exception the latter have
under most state usury laws.178 As noted earlier in this article, however,
while both pawnbrokers and title pawns rely on security agreements, title
pawns do not actually hold the personal property as collateral as do
pawnbrokers. 7 9 Title pawns hold only a motor vehicle's title. Hence, a
number of courts have precluded title pawns from the pawnbroker
exception. 180

174. Id. at 1273 ("Interpret[ing] RISA as incorporating the criminal usuary statute
caps of [thirty percent]."). Retail Installment Sales Act of 1960, N.J. SrAT. ANN.
§§ 17:16C-1 to -16 (West 2001).
175. See Drysdale & Keest, supra note 102, at 641-42 (discussing decisions by Kansas,
Virginia, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Indiana).
176. See Hamilton v. York, 987 F. Supp. 953, 956 (E.D. Ky. 1997) (finding the charges
plaintiffs incurred were interest from short term loans and covered under Kentucky's
Usury statute).
177. White v. Check Holder, Inc., 996 S.W.2d 496, 500 (Ky. 1999).
178. See Drysdale & Keest, supra note 102, at 639 (noting such efforts have not been
successful).
179. See Martin & Adams, supra note 108 ("A title loan is a high-interest, deeply
over-secured consumer loan, in which the consumer uses an unencumbered automobile as
collateral for a non-purchase money loan.").
180. Pendleton v. Am. Title Brokers, 754 F. Supp. 860, 864-65 (S.D. Ala. 1991) (holding the defendant's title pawn business was "not a business of a bona fide pawn broker"
and therefore the defendant was "not exempt from the Alabama Small Loan Act"); West
Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. Pawn Am., 518 S.E.2d 859, 862 (W.Va. 1998) (holding a transaction that is "in reality a consumer loan with a usurious interest rate" is not a true pawn and
not covered under the pawnbroker exceptions of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and
Protection Act); Lynn v. Fin. Solutions Corp., 173 B.R. 894, 899 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1994)
(holding a title pawn "must .. . comply with all other applicable law governing the loan of
money with realty as security for the loan").
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Legislative Action

The various businesses discussed in this article have also been highly
scrutinized by state legislatures concerned with the exploitation of the
poor and the working poor, although some of these legislatures appear to
be focused on "consumer affairs" rather than socio-economic inequalities."s A bevy of legislative feints and stabs have resulted, which have
recently been summarized by Professors Susan Lorde Martin and Nancy
White Huckins.' 82 A majority of states have laws regulating rent-to-own
transactions, most commonly requiring that rent-to-own outlets disclose
the amount of each rental payment and their due date, the number of
payments necessary to acquire a given commodity, and any fees that
might be charged for delivery, late payments, and reinstatement of an
agreement.' 83 Most states also require outlets to provide either the cash
price if the commodities are bought outright from the dealer or the fair
market value of the commodity.' 84
The state legislatures have also tinkered in comparable ways with payday lending. In 2010, Wisconsin became the last state to enact at least
some form of payday lending legislation.' 8 ' Typically, states limit the financing fees charged in conjunction with a loan, loan amounts, and the
number of rollovers within a given transaction.186 Some states have also
explicitly brought payday lenders under state usury laws, which impose
limits on interest rates.

181. See, e.g., Editorial, Cracking Down on Payday Lenders, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 29,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/30/opinion/cracking-down-on-predatory-paydaylenders.html?_r=0; Erik Badia & Lukas I. Alpert, New York Passes Country's Toughest
Law on Rent-to-Own Businesses, Interest Rates Capped, N.Y. DAILY NEws, Aug. 6, 2010,
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/new-york-passes-country-toughest-law-rent-toown-businesses-interest-rates-capped-article-1.200973; Sudeep Reddy, States to Protect
Borrowers Who Turn to Cars for Cash, WALL STREET J., July 19, 2010, http://online.wsj
.com/news/articles/ SB10001424052748704746804575367250783943906.
182. Susan Lorde Martin & Nancy White Huckins, Consumer Advocates vs. The Rentto-Own Industry: Reaching a Reasonable Accommodation, 34 AM. Bus. L.J. 385, 396-97
(1997).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 396.
185. See Patrick Marley, Payday Lenders Back in Business with Looser Regulations,
MILWAUKEF WIS. J. SENTINEL, Dec. 9, 2012, http://www.jsonliiic.com/news/statepoiitics/
(noting
payday-lenders-back-in-business-with-looser-regulations-jt7useg-182755581.html
Wisconsin passed a bill limiting payday loans to fifteen hundred dollars or thirty-five percent of an individual's monthly income, whichever is less).
186. Mendenhall, supra note 2, at 318 (identifying typical state regulations for payday
lenders).
187. See Mendenhall, supra note 2, at 319 (discussing the usefulness of usury laws in
regulating payday lending and protecting consumers); see also, John D. Skees, The Resurrection of Historic Usury Principlesfor Consumption Loans in a FederalBanking System,
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No uniformity exists among the states that impose such caps on payday
loans, but it appears than an interest cap of thirty-six percent is emerging
as an unofficial national standard." As of 2012, seventeen states and
Washington, D.C. had a thirty-six percent interest cap. 189 The percentage
seems arbitrary on its surface, but it is modeled after a federal law that
caps interest on loans to active duty military personnel at thirty-six
percent. 190
Title loans, like payday loans, are regulated by states by either banning
them, allowing them to operate under "pawnshop exceptions," or by "authorizing and regulating them through statutes geared directly at title
lenders."1 9 1 Unlike payday loans, there is not as clear a consensus on
what specific interest cap there should be with title loans, however, states
are in the initial stages of establishing caps.19 2
Some states also limit the size of the loan that can be offered by a title
pawn and restrict the number of rollovers or require that after a set number of rollovers title pawns must begin reducing the loan's principle.1 93
The simplest limit on the size of a loan is a fixed dollar amount that would
apply to all title loans regardless of the resale value of the motor vehicle
for which the title is offered as collateral.1 9 4 A common statutory amount
is $2,500.195 Some of the more innovative state laws, however, attempt to
limit the size of the loan based on the borrower's ability to repay the
loan.'9 6 This would require that the title pawn examine the borrower's

55 CAIL U. L. Ruv. 1131, 1137-38 (2006) (stating state usury limits are a service to citizens because the limits prevent interest rates that are "per se too high").
188. Martin & Longa, supra note 151, at 525 n.3.
189. Id.
190. Mendenhall, supra note 2, at 327 (noting the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act of
2003 (SCRA) enacted limitations on lenders making "loans to military personnel and their
families").
191. Hawkins, supra note 148, at 538.
192. See QUiESTER & Fox, supra note 119, at 15 (discussing ways to establish fair and
affordable loan terms). A number of states do not limit the interest rates title lenders may
charge, "including Illinois, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, and Utah."
Id. Other states, such as Tennessee, Georgia, Mississippi, and Montana allow interest
yielding around a two hundred and sixty to three hundred percent annual rate. Id. However, Florida has limited interest to thirty percent and Kentucky has limited title loan
charges to thirty-six percent. Id. Kansas caps interest at thirty-six percent. Hawkins, supra
note 148, at 576.
193. Hawkins, supra note 148, at 584 (highlighting that some states "limit the number
of times a customer can rollover a title loan[,]" whereas other states, like Tennessee, require the lender to start reducing the principal owed on the loan after a certain number of
rollovers have occurred).
194. Id. at 586.
195. Id. at 587
196. Id.
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current and expected income, other indebtedness, employment, and
credit rating to gauge the borrower's overall financial wherewithal.'" Illinois, meanwhile, bars any loans with a single payment exceeding fifty
percent of the borrower's monthly income.' 98
C.

Can the Judiciary or Legislature Protect Poor Consumers?

Do the leading judicial decisions and the important state laws related
to rent-to-own, payday lending, and title pawn businesses protect the urban poor from exploitation, or at least have the potential to protect the
urban poor? One has reason to think not. This is largely because rent-toown operations, payday lenders, and title pawns have sophisticated, adjustable business models that use core agreements which enable them to
elude whatever snares well-intentioned judges and legislators set for
them.
Todd J. Zywicki, a skeptic of usury regulations in general, has cogently
outlined the ways businesses preying on the poor can circumvent the regulations.' 99 In Zywicki's opinion, "liberal reform" invariably produces
negative unintended consequences exceeding any benefits.2 00 The businesses might, for example, engage in re-pricing, the process by which
lenders increase the price of unregulated parts of the transaction or on
related products in order to offset what might be lost to usury
limitations.2 01
A rent-to-own outlet, for example, is quite willing to bundle the core
transaction with insurance sales or additional fees.202 If usury caps limit
what may be charged for an installment sale, the cost of insurance could
easily be raised. "The final result," Zywicki argues, "will be to vitiate
many of the intended benefits of the regulation by circumventing the intended effects of the price controls. This would make consumers worse
off as a group by encouraging a new pricing system that is less efficient
and less transparent than that which would otherwise prevail." 2 0 3
Additionally, businesses might engage in product substitution in order
to avoid rate caps. 2 0 Product substitution arises when certain regulations
197. Id. (noting some statues make it clear this "does not require a formal credit
check").
198. Id at 587-88.
199. See Zywicki, supra note 122, at 427-32 (discussing three unintended consequences of usury regulations: term re-pricing, substitution, and rationing).
200. Id. at 427.
201. Id. at 428.
202. Hawkins, supra note 2, at 2055-56 (including preferred customer programs and
behavior-driven fees).
203. Zywicki, supra note 122, at 429.
204. Id. at 430-31.
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make it impossible for the lender to price its products in a way that would
make the transaction economically feasible.20 5 A payday lender, for example, could offer a rent-to-own arrangement or a title loan, or even operate as an old-fashioned pawnbroker, assuming the latter possibilities
are unregulated.20 6 Some commentators, for instance, have claimed that
the growth of auto title lending in some states resulted from regulations
that eliminated payday lending." 2 0 7
Then, too, payday lenders in Wisconsin shifted to what they call "installment loans," extremely high-interest loans that are not covered by
the state's payday lending regulation.2 0 8 Some of these installment loans
have annual interest rates of over 500 percent. 2 0 9 An outside observer
might think borrowers would realize these loans are exploitative, but
"many of the people who accept [them] are unsophisticated and unable to
understand the ramifications of such loans." 2 10 One disappointed Wisconsin legal services attorney observes that the industry "just kind of
morphs depending on the law to regulate them." 2 1 1
In the end, rent-to-own outlets, payday lenders, and title pawns still do
business and continue to focus on the urban poor more so than any other
group. After its loss in the Perez litigation, Rent-A-Center agreed to pay
class action plaintiffs in New Jersey $109 million to reimburse them for
the amounts their payments exceeded the amount allowable under New
Jersey's usury law.2 12 Even in light of this huge settlement, the company
seemed genuinely indifferent. For the first quarter of 2007, Rent-ACenter reported revenues of $755.3 million, and a company spokesman
said Rent-A-Center would finance the settlement through its regular operating budget.21 3

205. Id. at 430.
206. See id. (providing a similar example where a title lender is unable to price its risk
sufficiently with a title loan so he offers the borrower a pawn loan, payday loan, or rent-toown option instead).
207. Id. at 431.
208. Marley, supra note 185.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. $109 Million Rent-A-Center Class Action Settlement for New Jersey Customers,
WILLIAMS CUKER BEREZOFSKY AiTrORNEYS AT LAw, http://www.wcblegal.com/news.php?
action=view&id=18 (last visited Oct. 26, 2013) (stating the reimbursements are for customers who entered into agreements with Rent-A-Center between April 23, 1999 and March
16, 2007).
213. Michael Booth, Suit Over 'Rent-to-Own' Agreements Settles for $109 Million in
New Jersey, N.J. L.J., May 3, 2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005554990&
Suit_OverRenttoOwnAgreementsSettlesfor109Million-inNewJersey&sIreturn=
20130823150140.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

29

The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice, Vol. 16 [2022], No. 2, Art. 1

252

THE SCHOLAR

[Vol. 16:223

Despite their losses in the courts and regulation from the state legislatures, payday loan outlets have come to outnumber McDonald's and
Starbucks stores combined.21 4 In California, a state known for its progressive consumer legislation, title pawns do $20 million in business
annually. 215
Moreover, due to courtroom decisions and legislative enactments, the
rent-to-own, payday lending, and title lending businesses have been legitimized. That is, while the courtroom decisions and regulatory legislation
evidence some degree of willingness to police these tawdry businesses,
the decisions and legislation implicitly recognize the businesses' right to
continue their operations. Courts and legislatures do more than prescribe
and proscribe; they also recognize and countenance. Buoyed not so much
with the state's stamp of approval as the state's tacit acceptance, these
suspect businesses are, at least in keeping with their own business models,
doing well.
VI.

CONcLusION

From a legal perspective, it is tempting to say judicial decisions and
legislative enactments are locked in a battle against the sophisticated contractual agreements proffered by the rent-to-own, payday lending, and
title pawn businesses. However, this is not an accurate representation of
the current situation. It is more accurate to say that the rent-to-own, payday lending, and title pawn businesses have found and secured their
places in the contemporary economy. Their business models and standardized agreements are quite suitable, and selling commodities to the
urban poor at high prices and lending money to the urban poor at extraordinarily high interest rates are viable American enterprises.
Perhaps, in this sense, we should not be surprised by the exploitation of
the urban poor. The rent-to-own, payday lending, and title pawn businesses, after all, do not have a monopoly on using people and manipulating their hopes and dreams to turn a profit. They also do not have a
monopoly on charging the urban poor more. One study has found a price
differential between wealthy and poor neighborhoods of ten to fifteen

214. Martin & Longa, supra note 151, at 526.
215. See David Lazarus, Lenders Levy Up to 120% Interest - Legally/Loophole Lets
Firms Target the Poor, Military Families, S.F. CIRONICuE, Sept. 29, 2004, http://www.sfgate
.com/ news/article/Lenders-levy-up-to-120-interest-legally-2690850.php (noting because of
a loophole in California law, money lenders can charge up to one hundred and twenty
percent interest in addition to repossessing vehicles as collateral).
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percent for everyday items. 2 16 One journalist characterizes this price differential as a "ghetto tax." 2 1 7
The most troubling aspect of these businesses is that each, in its own
way, consciously attempts to place the urban poor on a "debt treadmill."
Profits go up when the urban poor cannot pay up. Hence, these businesses not only exploit poverty, but they increase and perpetuate it.
Should this be tolerated? Some practices so fundamentally affront our
shared values that they should quite simply be prohibited. It is one thing
to exploit the urban poor; it is another to systematically worsen their socioeconomic condition and subject them to greater control and subservience. In other words, we might tolerate exploitation in our market
economy, but we should not tolerate subjugation. You may take people's
money and the value of their labor, but you should not be able to put a
permanent economic yoke on them to the point of their subordination.
By deliberately making the urban poor even poorer, the rent-to-own,
payday lending, and title pawn businesses do just that and should be
banned.
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